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We provide evidence that the financing decisions of companies that are audited by a Big 
Six auditor are less affected by information asymmetry.  Specifically, these companies 
enjoy greater financial flexibility and depend less on favorable market conditions for their 
equity issuance decisions than those not audited by a Big Six firm.  As a consequence, 
their debt ratios are less affected either by their past stock price performance or by Baker 
and Wurgler’s [2002] measure of market timing.  In addition, consistent with the idea that 
these firms are able to issue equity more regularly, we find that these firms have lower 
target debt ratios.  These results are economically significant.  They are robust to 
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1.  Introduction 
The theoretical literature has long recognized that asymmetry of information between 
companies’ and outside investors could affect companies’ financing choices (e.g., 
Modigliani and Miller [1958], Ross [1977], Leland and Pyle [1977], Myers and Majluf 
[1984]).  The financial statements obviously play a critical role in reducing this 
asymmetry, and their integrity is essential to well functioning capital markets. In this 
context, auditors are called upon to play a key role in the certification of this information.  
Yet, all auditors may not offer the same level of service.  The theoretical literature 
usually suggests that large firms (such as the “Big Six”)
1 provide better auditing services 
than smaller auditors because of three distinct (not mutually exclusive) reasons: they have 
greater monitoring ability (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman [1981]), they have a more 
valuable reputation to protect (e.g., DeAngelo [1981]), and they have “deeper pockets” in 
case of litigation (e.g., Dye [1993]). In turn, this higher level of certification should 
reduce the information asymmetry between informed managers and outsiders and thus 
affect financial decisions. However, the empirical evidence supporting these predictions 
is limited (although not inconsistent with this idea).  Healy and Palepu [2001], for 
instance, note a “paucity of evidence on the value of auditor opinions to investors”.   
Similarly, Mansi et al. [2004] state: “the empirical evidence that links audits to investors 
is limited and mixed”.  Consistent with this position, Chaney et al. [2004] find no 
evidence of higher fees when Big Six firms audit private companies (after controlling for 
                                                 
1 We follow the convention of calling the main firms the Big Six, although their number varied over time 
from initially 8 to currently 4.   4
the endogeneity of the auditor choice).  To further our understanding of these issues, in 
this paper we investigate two distinct but related questions.  
  In a first series of tests, we examine the effect of the higher certification on 
companies’ capital structure decisions.  Specifically, we examine whether better auditing 
allows companies to maintain lower debt-equity ratios and to issue more equity as 
opposed to debt.  Consistent with the theoretical literature, we hypothesize that 
companies audited by Big Six firms face a lower information asymmetry.  We also 
hypothesize that, in turn, this lower information asymmetry should affect their capital 
structure.  Since equity is informationally more sensitive than debt (e.g., Myers and 
Majluf [1984]), our prior is that these companies should issue more equity and maintain 
lower debt ratios.  Our results are consistent with these predictions.  We show that 
companies audited by a Big Six firm have less debt in their capital structure.  In addition, 
our robustness checks indicate that these companies have a lower likelihood of debt 
issuance when they decide to issue either debt or equity in a given year.  They also fund a 
lower proportion of their financing deficit through debt.  Our results hold in the overall 
sample but are usually stronger for smaller companies, where financial statements 
represents a larger part of the information set of outside investors. 
  In a second series of tests, we find evidence showing that the timing of security 
issuance is affected by auditor quality.  The “market timing” theory argues that 
companies’ equity issuance decisions are concentrated in time periods that present a 
“window of opportunity”.  Favorable conditions in the equity markets are either likely to 
represent periods when the adverse selection is relatively less important (Choe, Masulis 
and Nanda [1993], Lucas and McDonald [1990]), or when stock prices have diverged   5
upward from their fundamental value (Baker and Wurgler [2002],  Baker, Ruback and 
Wurgler [2004]).  Thus, firms are likely to exploit the opportunity presented by these 
time periods and issue equity; however, the tendency should be especially significant for 
firms for which information asymmetry problems are more endemic, since these time 
periods present these firms with an opportunity to rebalance their capital structures or 
build up financial slack and debt capacity.  Increasing auditor quality decreases the 
likelihood that managers’ private valuation is not aligned with that of the market and, 
thus, reduces the incentives to time security issuances.  We use two specifications to test 
this hypothesis.  In the first one, we consider the effect of past stock returns on changes in 
capital structure.  We predict that some companies should behave opportunistically and 
be more likely to issue equity after favorable stock returns.  However, this effect should 
be stronger for companies that are not audited by Big Six firms.  Consistent with our 
hypothesis that higher auditing quality reduces the incentive to time the market, we find 
that the debt ratios of companies audited by Big Six firms are less affected by the past 
returns.  In the second specification, we use the measure of market timing developed by 
Baker and Wurgler [2002] (BW hereafter).  Similarly, we find that the debt ratios of 
companies audited by Big Six firms are less affected by the BW [2002] measure. 
  All these results are both economically and statistically significant.  They hold both in 
cross-sectional and panel settings.  In addition, as first noted by Copley et al. [1995] and 
Ireland and Lennox [2001], the auditor choice is likely to be endogenous and companies 
may self-select based on company characteristics.  We replicate our Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) tests using different specifications designed to control for this 
endogeneity. A traditional approach to deal with endogeneity is to use Two Stage Least   6
Squares (2SLS) procedure.  However, our endogenous variable is a binary one, so we 
cannot use the standard approach.  Instead, we employ an alternative, but comparable, 
two-stage strategy.  In the first stage, we predict the likelihood of the company to select a 
Big Six auditor and we use this predicted value in the second stage.  We boot-strap the 
system 500 times to obtain consistent standard errors.  In addition, we use a two-stage 
procedure (Heckman [1979]) in our capital structure regression.  Our results are robust to 
these controls for the possible endogeneity of auditor choice. 
Finally, to reinforce our interpretation of the results based on information asymmetry 
and to control for other informational intermediaries, we perform an additional test.  We 
include analyst coverage as an additional control variable.  Financial (equity) analysts, 
like the Big Six auditors, also have the property of reducing information asymmetry but 
the distribution of the two variables is very different.  Most large companies are audited 
by a Big Six firm but there is a fair amount of variation for smaller companies. On the 
other hand, relatively few small companies are covered by analysts but there is a large 
variation in the number of analysts covering larger companies.  The effect of an 
improvement in analyst coverage has a pattern similar to the effect of an improvement in 
auditing but the effect of auditing exists independently of other informational 
intermediaries.  
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways.  First, our tests examine 
whether Big Six auditors contribute to financial flexibility by making the firms’ equity 
issuance decisions less sensitive to equity market conditions.  Equity market conditions 
play an important role in shaping corporate financing policies.  For example, survey 
evidence (Graham and Harvey [2001]) indicate that managers consider equity market   7
prices as more important than 9 out 10 other factors in their decision to issue common 
stock.  This is consistent with an extensive literature indicating that companies tend to 
issue equity instead of debt when market value is high (see Baker and Wurgler [2002] for 
a review of a long list of papers).  To the best of our knowledge, prior research has not 
considered the effect of auditing quality on this behavior. 
Our other set of results on capital structure relate to recent findings that auditor 
quality affects both the cost of equity in Initial Public Offerings (e.g., Willemborg [1999], 
Copley and Douthett [2002]) and the cost of debt (e.g., Mansi et al. [2004], Pittman and 
Fortin [2004]).  Although traditional capital structure theory suggests that an asymmetric 
reduction in the costs of equity versus debt would lead firms to issue more equity relative 
to debt, it is not known whether reducing information asymmetry should have a first 
order economic effect on debt ratios, or merely be a sideshow.  In addition, as noted by 
Mansi et al. [2004], the pricing of bonds is relatively well-defined but there is much 
debate as to what the correct pricing model should be for equity (and how the parameters 
should be empirically estimated). Perhaps for this reason, the literature has examined the 
effect of auditor choice on the cost of equity only during Initial Public Offerings (IPO).  
Looking at capital structure essentially considers the cost of equity relative to the cost of 
debt instead of trying to evaluate the absolute cost of equity.  Therefore, showing that 
auditor quality has a first order effect on debt ratios extends the prior results outside the 
IPO setting.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates our hypotheses and 
methodology. The sample and variables are defined in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.   8
2. Hypotheses Development and Empirical Specification 
  Based on prior literature, we hypothesize that higher auditing quality, proxied by 
whether the auditor is a Big Six firm or not, mitigates information asymmetry in the 
financial markets. We consider several implications of this hypothesis for corporate 
financing decisions, both in terms of the likelihood and the level of debt issuance 
(relative to equity) and in terms of the timing of equity issuance.  
 
Auditor size, Audit Quality and Information Asymmetry 
  The literature has long recognized that managers know more about the economic 
situation of the company than outside suppliers of capital and that they may use this 
superior knowledge to behave opportunistically.  In response, investors have required that 
managers report periodically and that their statements are verified by an independent 
party (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman [1983]).  The Public has been reminded of the 
importance of this function by recent accounting scandals.  Essentially, auditors serve 
two main functions.  First, they review actual financial statements and the procedures 
designed to produce them.  In addition to this monitoring role, they also provide an 
insurance device by indemnifying investors when they have suffered an economic loss 
caused by misleading financial statements. 
  Yet, all auditors may not offer the level of service.  The theoretical literature 
suggests that large firms provide better auditing services than smaller auditors.  For 
example, Willenborg [1999] states that: “it is widely perceived that larger, more 
prestigious firms have greater incentives not to perform a low-quality audit at a high-
quality price”. Different reasons have been proposed for this.  For example, Watts and   9
Zimmerman [1981] suggest that bigger firms have greater monitoring ability, while 
DeAngelo [1981] points out that they have a more valuable reputation to protect.  Dye 
[1993] theorizes the idea that they have “deeper pockets” in case of litigation.  Menon 
and Williams [1994] (among others) provide empirical support for this third view.   
  In turn, this higher level of certification should reduce the information asymmetry 
between informed managers and outsiders, and thus affect financial decisions. For 
example, Becker et al. [1998] states:  “auditing reduces information asymmetries that 
exists between managers and firm stakeholders by allowing outsiders to verify the 
validity of financial statements.”  Titman and Trueman [1986] and Datar et al. [1991] 
provides models in which the value of a firm issuing security is increasing in the quality 
of its auditor.  Empirically, Willenborg [1999] finds that auditor size is negatively related 
to IPO underpricing (a setting where information asymmetry is expected to be 
particularly strong), while Mansi et al. [2004] and Pittman and Fortin [2004] find that 
larger auditors (proxied by whether they are a Big Six firm or not) are associated with a 
lower cost of debt for their clients. Weber and Willenborg [2003] find that the pre-IPO 
opinions of larger auditors are more predictive of post-IPO negative stock delistings for a 
sample of microcap IPOs.  
 
Audit Quality and the Debt-Equity Choice 
The determinants of firms’ capital structure and financing decisions is one of the 
main topics of research in corporate finance, as evidenced by the impressive number of 
papers and reviews published on the topic. Harris and Raviv [1991] provides an early 
survey of an already large literature; Rajan and Zingales [1995] examine the robustness   10
of cross-sectional correlations in international data; Graham and Harvey [2001] provides 
extensive survey evidence on corporate financing decisions, while Fama and French 
[2002] revisit some traditional issues in capital structure. 
  It is well recognized in this literature that asymmetry of information between 
firms and outside investors could affect firms’ financing choices and capital structure 
decisions. For example, Modigliani and Miller’s [1958] irrelevance result does not hold if 
there is information asymmetry between the company’s insiders and outsiders. It is also 
well accepted that in the presence of information asymmetry, equity issues should be 
more affected than debt, since payments to debt holders are senior fixed claims.
2  As a 
result, the theoretical literature (Myers and Majluf [1984], Lucas and McDonald [1990], 
Choe, Masulis and Nanda [1993]) primarily considers how adverse selection due to 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders affects equity issuance. If the 
“trade-off model” is a correct theoretical description of capital structure (i.e., if 
companies tradeoff the benefits and costs of issuing debt and equity in determining their 
capital structure), then companies suffering from more information asymmetry should 
have higher debt ratios as they try to mitigate the informational costs of equity issuance 
by relying more on debt financing.  
  However, prior empirical evidence linking information asymmetry with capital 
structure is far from convincing.  Proxies for information asymmetry either have weak or 
ambiguous effects in capital structure regressions, or ambiguous interpretations.  For 
example, the standard deviations of sales or of stock returns, and the number of business 
segments in which the firm operates, typically have weak effects; firm size can proxy for 
less information asymmetry, but bigger firms have more debt; R&D expenditure can 
                                                 
2 If debt is risk-free, it is not subject to any adverse selection at all.   11
proxy for more information asymmetry, but more R&D is associated with less  debt; 
young firms are supposedly more subject to information asymmetry, but they rely more 
on equity financing than on debt (Frank and Goyal [2003,a]).  We use a more direct 
proxy, the quality of the auditor to revisit this literature.  As explained above, higher 
auditing quality should reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, companies with 
greater audit certification should experience lower costs of issuing equity relative to debt.  
To the extent that companies trade-off costs and benefits, we expect those with a lower 
cost of equity (relative to debt) maintain lower debt ratios and issue relatively more 
equity.  
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the standard “target adjustment model” (e.g., 
Jalilvand and Harris [1984], Auerbach [1985], Fama and French [2002], and more 
recently, Flannery and Rangan [2004]): 
 
(TDMi,t - TDMi,t-1)=  α1 +φ (TDMi,t
* - TDMi,t-1) + εi,t                         (1) 
 
where TDMi,t is the leverage ratio at time t for company i, TDMi,t-1 is leverage ratio 
lagged one period.  The market leverage ratio (TDM) is defined as the ratio of book value 
of total debt to quasi-market value of assets (total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity).
3  TDM
*
i,t denotes the target debt ratio for company i at time t, 




                                                 
3 As a robustness check, we define the leverage ratio in terms of the book value (i.e., book value of total 
debt divided by book value of assets).  Our main results still hold.   12
TDM
*
i,t =  α2 + γ BigSixi,t-1 + λi Ci,t-1          (2) 
 
Here, BigSixi,t-1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the auditor is a 
Big Six firms, zero otherwise.
4 By substituting equation (2) into equation (1), we reduce 
the target adjustment model to:
5 
    
   TDMi,t =  α3 +(1- φ) TDMi,t-1 + µ BigSixi,t-1 +  νi Ci,t-1    + εi,t        (3) 
where    µ = φγ , and νi =φ λi 
 
We control for j variables (C) that have been shown by prior literature to influence 
capital structure (e.g., Frank and Goyal [2003, a]).  A complete list of these variables as 
well as a discussion of their possible impact on companies’ financing decisions is 
provided in the Appendix.  We expect µ to be negative.
6 
 
Auditor Quality and Market Timing Theory 
  The “market timing theory” argues that managers look at current conditions in 
both the debt and equity markets and opt for the means of financing that seems to be 
                                                 
4  BigSix takes the value of one if Compustat item 149 has a value comprised between 100 and 800, zero 
otherwise. 
5 Fama and French [2002] substitute the fitted values from an OLS regression on (2) into (1), and then 
estimate (1) using the procedure of Fama and MacBeth [1973].  Since our interest is the co-efficient of 
BigSix, we follow the recent literature (see Flannery and Rangan [2004]) in directly estimating (3).  Our 
results hold if we leave the target adjustment model and merely estimate (2) by OLS. 
6 Fama and French [2002] suggest that the literature on capital structure revolves around two competing 
models: the “trade-off” model and the “pecking order” model. In their empirical specification, Fama and 
French [2002] include some additional terms involving firms’ current and past investment and earnings. 
Their objective in doing so is to nest the tradeoff model and the Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH) in the 
same model.  The POH predicts that φ should be zero, while the trade-off theory says it should be positive. 
Recent work, however, (e.g., Frank and Goyal [2003,a], Leary and Roberts [2005]) suggest some empirical 
challenges for the Pecking Order theory. Since our objective is not to discriminate between theories but 
rather establish that higher quality auditing reduces information asymmetry, we do not nest the two models.   13
currently more favorable, or not issue any securities at all if market conditions are not 
favorable. Companies subject to higher information asymmetry are more likely to suffer 
from unfavorable misvaluation (e.g., Myers and Majluf [1984]). If they are undervalued 
and are unable to issue equity, they may be forced to seek alternative means of financing, 
such as debt, for their projects.  Thus, these firms will issue equity less frequently, and 
also be further away from an optimal target debt ratio.  On the other hand, when they are 
overvalued because of market sentiment, or when the information asymmetry is reduced 
because of general business conditions (see Choe et al. [1993]), these firms will have the 
incentive to make bigger issues of equity to rebalance their capital structures.  This means 
that it is especially important for these companies to take advantage of temporary 
improvements in market conditions to issue equity.  Alternatively, all managers may want 
to take advantage of any perceived temporary mispricing that benefits existing 
shareholders at the expense of new investors; however, mispricing is more likely to occur 
when a greater information asymmetry exists between managers and outside suppliers of 
capital.
7   
  We predict that companies experiencing a lower audit quality will have greater 
opportunities to time the market.  This prediction also relates to the earnings management 
literature.  Prior results (e.g., Loughran and Ritter [1995], Rajan and Servaes [1997], 
Teoh et al. [1998a, 1998b] and Denis and Sarin [2001]) suggest that firms tend to issue 
equity at times when investors are enthusiastic about economic prospects.  On the other 
                                                 
7 Notice that market timing and target behavior are not inconsistent.  For example, Baker et al. [2004] point 
out that when firms time the market, they may not want to deviate too much from the target.  Similarly, we 
have argued above that firms subject to more information asymmetry may time the market to rebalance 
their capital structures or to avoid being over-levered in the future. 
   14
hand, Becker et al. [1998] indicate that earnings management is less prevalent for 
companies that are audited by Big Six firms. 
  We test this prediction in two ways. First, we consider how past equity returns 
affect changes in capital structure.  As we argued above, all firms would try to take 
advantage of favorable conditions in the equity market to issue equity. Thus, in general, 
there should be a negative relation between past stock returns and the current debt ratio.  
However, if firms that do not have Big Six auditors are more subject to information 
asymmetry or are more likely to be temporarily overvalued when market conditions are 
favorable, then they should issue equity more aggressively. Thus, the association between 
past stock returns and the debt ratio should be stronger for these firms. To examine this 
prediction, we calculate Accumulated Stock Return (ASR) by compounding monthly stock 
returns from t-5 to t.  We then estimate the following model with an interaction between 
ASR and BigSix: 
 
(TDMt - TDMt-5) = δ0 + δ1ASRi,t + δ2(ASR × BigSix)i,t + δ3BigSixi,t + γ∆C,i,t
 + εi,t         (4) 
 
We expect that δ2, the coefficient of the interaction between BigSix and ASR, should 
be positive in equation (4).  ∆C represents the changes in the same set of k control 
variables that appear in equation (3).
8  In addition, the tradeoff theory suggests that the 
change in the debt ratio will also be related to whether or not the company is above or 
below the target at t-5.  Deviation from the target leverage ratio at t-5 is proxied by the 
                                                 
8 We drop the control variables related to R&D from this test as these are essentially fixed firm 
characteristics.   15
difference between the leverage ratio and the target debt ratio estimated using equation 
(2) at t-5. 
Second, we consider how an “external finance weighted-average” market-to-book 
ratio, introduced by Baker and Wurgler [2002], affects companies’ capital structure.   
Baker and Wurgler [2002] argue that if companies issued equity rather than debt when 
market conditions were better in the past, then a past “external finance weighted-average” 
market-to-book ratio (a proxy for market conditions) will have a negative effect on the 
current debt ratio.  We use their proxy: 
 

























MBA BW     (5) 
where Disus and Eisus  denote, respectively, net debt and equity issue at time s.
9 The 
market-to-book ratio (MBA) is the ratio of the quasi-market value of assets to the book 
value of assets. The intuition is that if for the same aggregate amount of external 
financing (Disu+Eisu), a company issues more equity relative to debt when the market-
to-book ratio is high, then the debt-equity ratio should be lower subsequently. Thus, for 
companies “timing” the market more actively, there should be a stronger negative 
relation between the past external finance-weighted market-to-book ratio and the current 
capital structure.
10 
                                                 
9 Following BW [2002], we set the minimum weight (sum of net debt issued and net equity issued) to zero 
and drop firm-year observations in which BW5MBA exceeds 10.0.  
10 An alternative interpretation of a negative coefficient for BWMBA that is consistent with a market 
timing interpretation has been suggested by Hovakimian [2005]. Hovakimian argues that the BWMBA 
variable contains information about future growth opportunities not captured by the current market-to-book 
ratio. Firms may want to issue equity and build up debt capacity when market conditions are good (which 
also indicates promising growth opportunities for the future) in order to ensure that they can avoid issuing 
equity later under unfavorable market conditions.    16
 
We examine the effect of the auditor quality and BW’s ratio (measured from t-5 to t) 
on the change in the debt ratio over the same period. To do so, we introduce an 
interaction between BW5MBA and BigSix: 
 
 (TDMt - TDMt-5) = β0 + β1 BW5MBAi,t + β2(BW5MBA × BigSix)i,t + β3 BigSixi,t  
                                + θ∆C,i,t
 + εi,t              (6) 
 
We expect that β2, the coefficient of the interaction between BigSix and BW5MBA, 
should be positive in equation (6).  
 
3. Data, Variable Construction and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Sample 
Our main sample consists of companies listed in the Compustat Industrial Annual 
Files at any point between 1974 and 2003.
11  Data on stock prices and returns is retrieved 
from CRSP Files.  Financial, insurance and real estate companies (i.e., SIC code 6000-
6900), regulated utilities (SIC code 4900-4999), and companies with missing book value 
of assets are excluded.
12  This leads to a sample with 79,844 company-year observations.  
Details of the calculation of the financial variables are included in the Appendix.  All 
variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5% of their distribution.  This 
                                                 
11  Since this period overlaps with the Arthur Andersen-Enron fallout, we re-run our regressions after 
dropping post-2000 years.  Results are qualitatively similar. 
12 As a robustness check, we drop firms involved in large asset sales and significant mergers (identified by 
Compustat footnote code AB).  Results are essentially the same.   17
approach reduces the impact of extreme observations by assigning the cutoff value to 
values beyond the cutoff point.  Our results (not tabulated) are qualitatively very similar 
when we truncate the distribution instead of winsorizing it.   Dollar values are adjusted to 
2000 dollar using GDP deflator. 
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 reports the evolution of the percentage of companies audited by Big Six 
firms.  We evenly split the sample into three size groups according to the book value of 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. Group 1 consists of the smallest companies and 
group 3 includes the largest companies.
13  In the overall sample, 86% of the companies 
are audited by a Big Six auditor.  Noticeably, large companies more likely to be audited 
by a Big Six firm: the percentage of companies audited by a Big Six increases across the 
three sub-groups based on size (from 55% for small firms to 98% for large companies in 
2003). Overall, the market share of the Big Six varied over time, ranging from a low of 
81 percent in 1974 to a high of 89 percent in 1982 to 85% in 2003.  However, much of 
this growth is coming from larger companies.  Interestingly, we observe a decline in the 
percentage of smaller companies audited by Big Six firms during the recent years (from 
66% in 1974 to 53% in 2003).  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the overall sample and for the three size 
groups. For the smallest group of companies, alternative sources of reduction in 
information asymmetry are rare: the median number of analysts (not tabulated) is 0.25 
compared to 8.7 for the largest group, and only 1.4% of small companies have their debt 
                                                 
13 Note that the same firm can belong to different size groups over the period it is present in the sample, as 
the book value of its assets changes.   18
rated by Standard and Poor’s.  For these companies, auditors are likely to play a key role.  
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients among our key variables of interest.   
Univariate correlations suggest that being audited by a Big Six firm is positively 
correlated with size, profitability (ROA and Z-score, an inverse measure of bankruptcy 
risk) and the ratio of tangible to total assets (tangibility) and negatively related to the 
market to book ratio.  
 
3.3 Auditor Choice 
Table 3 reports the result of a Probit regression where the dependent variable is 
BigSix, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is audited by a Big 
Six firm, zero otherwise. This analysis provides the basis for our control for endogeneity 
of the auditor choice in Section 4.  In our choice of control variables,
14 we start by 
introducing different company characteristics: size, age, stock price, asset turnover, asset 
growth (Willenborg [1999]), Herfindhal index, current ratio (Weber and Willenborg 
[2003]) and whether or not the company discloses any R&D. We also control for 
profitability (Return on Assets (ROA) and its interaction with a dummy for loss, Chaney 
et al. [2004]). We include several measures for risk: a dummy variable for companies 
working in industry sectors with high litigation risk (Hogan [1997]), return and earnings 
volatility, industry median debt ratio and bankruptcy risk (z-score).  We also control for 
different measures of the complexity of the auditing assignment: the number of segments, 
                                                 
14 Aside from variables specific to the IPO context, Willenborg [1999] and Weber and Willenborg [2003] 
use the log of asset, leverage, current ratio and the existence of foreign subsidiaries in their first stage.  The 
existence of foreign subsidiary is not consistently available for our sample of firms but the two other factors 
are used.  We also use all the variables in Chaney et al. [2004], except the amount of exportation as this 
variable is not consistently available for our sample of US firms. In addition, we do not use the debt ratio as 
this variable is our main dependent variable in our second stage regression. Instead, we use the industry 
median.   19
the R&D intensity and asset tangibility.  Results indicate that bigger companies with a 
higher asset turnover and a larger price attract Big Six auditors.  Although profitability 
does not seem to play a big role (at least for small companies), all the risk variables are 
significant.  With the exception of the bankruptcy risk proxy, all variables indicate that 
Big Six auditors are less likely to audit risky companies.  The effect of the difficulty of 
auditing is more complicated.  For small companies, some variables indicate a positive 
correlation with the difficulty of the assignment (R&D intensity, current ratio) but other a 
negative correlation (number of segments, tangibility).  For larger companies, R&D 
intensity remains positive but the sign of the current ratio changes. To assess the accuracy 
of our classification, we predict that a company chooses a Big Six auditor if the 
probability estimated by our model is greater than 50 percent.  Our classification is 
accurate 85 percent of the time. Note, however, that our main objective here is not to 
explain this choice per se but rather to obtain a basis for our procedures that control for 
the endogeneity in Section 4. 
 
4.  Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1. Auditor Quality and Capital Structure Decisions 
In this section, we present results on the relation between auditor quality and three main 
aspects of capital structure decisions: the target leverage ratio, debt/equity choices and 
the funding of the financing deficit. 
Table 4 presents the results of the target adjustment model (equation (3)). To be 
consistent with previous literature that does not always endogenize the choice of auditor,   20
we first run an OLS procedure both for the overall sample and our 3 sub-samples based 
on size. We are careful to allow for clustering of observations by company to adjust the 
standard errors for serial correlation.  We also correct the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity.
15  The tabulated OLS results use the auditor choice lagged one period, 
but are qualitatively similar when we use the contemporary auditor or lag the variable by 
three periods.  In addition, we use different specification to endogenize the selection of 
the auditor. A traditional approach to deal with endogeneity is to use Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) procedure.  However, our endogenous variable is a binary one, so we 
cannot use the standard approach.  Instead, we employ an alternative, but comparable, 
two-stage strategy.  In the first stage, we predict the likelihood of the company to select a 
Big Six auditor and we use this predicted value in the second stage.  To further mitigate 
the effect of endogeneity, the auditor choice is lagged one period and is first predicted 
based on some company-specific variables lagged two periods. We boot-strap the system 
500 times to obtain consistent standard errors.  In addition, we use a two-stage procedure 
(Heckman [1979]) in our capital structure regression. Results from these two procedures 
are presented in Table 5. 
Results in both Table 4 and 5 indicate that being audited by a Big Six firm has a 
significant negative effect on the target leverage ratio for our overall sample and across 
all size groups.  The t-statistic is -4.4 in the OLS specification (Table 4, column 1) and -
9.2 in the Heckman case (Table 5, Column 2).  We present the bootstrapped 95% 
confidence interval in Table 5, Column 1.  The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
These results also hold when we use a panel (random effect) setting (z-statistic equals -
4.8, untabulated results).  The coefficient of the choice of auditor is economically 
                                                 
15 Results are unaffected when we cluster observations by year.    21
significant.  Being audited by a Big Six reduces the target debt ratio by 3.3% percentage 
points in the overall sample and 3.8% for smaller companies.
16  By comparison, 
increasing log of assets by one standard deviation would reduce the target debt ratio by 
approximately 2.8%.  When we turn our attention to the group size, we observe that the 
coefficient is more significant for smaller companies, both economically and statistically.  
Not surprisingly, the lagged capital structure in Table 4 and 5 is extremely significant but 
results are qualitatively similar when the lagged capital structure is excluded from the 
regression.  Other control variables generally have the expected signs. 
Having established that auditing quality has significantly negative effects on the 
target debt ratio, we then consider two additional robustness checks.  First, we examine 
whether the auditor selection affects debt-equity choice of companies in a given year.  To 
do so, we estimate a Probit regressions similar to Hovakimian et al. [2002]: the dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 if the net debt issued constitutes more than 5% of book value 
of assets, and zero if the net equity issued divided by the book value of assets exceeds 
5%.
17  Untabulated results indicate that companies with better auditing issue debt less 
frequently than equity.  The z-statistic equals –2.5 in the Probit specification.  Results 
hold when we use a panel (random effect) specification, a bivariate Probit procedure 
specification (to simultaneously model the decision of issuing debt and to choose a Big 
Six auditor) or a boot-strapped procedure (similar to the one described in section 4.1.).   
                                                 
16 Switching from non Big Six to Big Six decreases the target debt ratio by 0.005 (0.007 for small firms) 
divided by 1 minus the coefficient of the lagged debt ratio. From Table 4, the latter is 0.848 (0.816 for 
small firms), implying that the target decreases by (0.005/(1-0.851)=3.3% in the overall sample and 3.8% 
in the sample of smaller firms. 
17 Consistent with past literature, company years where the net amount issued divided by the book value of 
assets is less than 5% or both debt and equity are issued in a given fiscal year are omitted. We control 
variables similar to those in Hovakimian et al. [2002]: the deviation of the leverage ratio from the industry 
median debt ratio, which is known to be an important determinant of the target debt ratio.     22
Lastly, we examine whether companies audited by Big Six firms fund a larger 
proportion of the financing deficit with debt (instead of equity).  We use a framework 
similar to Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999].  However, unlike Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
our purpose is not to test a theory of financial hierarchy, but rather, examine the extent to 
which firms rely on debt financing to bridge the financing gap.
18  We regress the debt 
issue size on the financing deficit
19 (both scaled by the book value of assets) and include 
company fixed effects.
20  The parameter of interest is the coefficient estimate on the 
deficit scaled by book value of assets.  We split our sample between companies that are 
audited by a Big Six firm and those are not for each of our three size sub-samples.  We 
find the coefficient on the size of the deficit is significantly larger in each size sub-sample 
for the companies that are not audited by a big six firm, indicating that the companies not 
audited by Big Six firms show a significantly higher dependence on debt financing.   
These results hold both when the model is estimated with an OLS or a boot-strapped 
procedure.  The economic magnitude is such that the dependence on debt is reduced by 
approximately one third for small companies audited by a Big Six.  For medium and large 
companies, the effect is approximately 14% and 8% respectively.
21  W e  o b t a i n  
comparable results when we regress the debt issue size on the financing deficit and its 
                                                 
18 Chirinko and Singha [2000] note several empirical problems with this specification when it is used to 
distinguish between trade-off theory and pecking order theory.  We do not try to make this distinction. 
19 Following prior literature, the financing deficit is defined as the sum of the amount of dividend payment, 
the amount of capital expenditure, the net increase in working capital, the current portion of long term debt 
at the beginning of the period, but minus the operating cash-flows after interest and taxes. 




µ ε =+ + +  
where Disu is net debt issued, BVA is the book value of assets, Deficit is the financing deficit, µi is a firm-
specific fixed effect, and εit is an error term. The co-efficient “b” indicates the proportion of the deficit that 
is financed with debt. All our results are unaffected when we include the control variables proposed by 
Frank and Goyal [2003,b]: tangibility of assets, change in market-to-book ratio, change in log of sales and 
change return in assets.  
21 The ratios of coefficients for the three size groups are: 0.26/0.19 = 1.47; 0.43/0.37 =1.16 and 0.65/0.59 = 
1.10.   23
interaction with BigSix.  The interaction is significantly negative at 1% level in each size 
sub-sample. 
 
4.2 Auditor Quality and Market Timing 
In this section, we examine whether the leverage ratios of companies audited by Big 
Six firms are less affected by market timing strategy compared to companies that are not. 
Figure 2 provides some preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis that firms not 
audited by Big Six auditors issue equity more aggressively when market conditions are 
favorable. In Panel A (Panel B), we compare the proportion of firms in the two groups 
issuing equity after a positive equity shock (respectively, a year of high market-to-book 
ratio). A positive equity shock is defined as a year in which stock returns at least one 
standard deviation above the firm-specific mean, while a firm year is classified as a year 
of high market-to-book ratio if the latter is above the 75
th percentile of the distribution. 
The Figure reveals that a higher proportion of firms in the “non-Big Six” group issue 
equity immediately after a positive equity shock, or after a year of high market-to-book 
ratio. 
In our regressions, we use two main proxies for market conditions: past equity returns 
and the BW’s [2002]
 “ external finance weighted-average” market-to-book ratio.  We 
report the results of estimating equation (4) (with the accumulated stock return) in Table 
6 and equation (6) (with the BW’s measure) in Table 7. We use both an OLS (column 1) 
and two-stage bootstrap procedure (column 2).  
In all specifications, our proxy for market timing (ASR or BW5MBA) is negative. This 
is consistent with the idea that companies time the market to issue more equity when   24
market conditions are good. However, its interaction between BigSix and ASR or 
BW5MBA is positive both in the OLS estimation (the t-statistic equals 5.3, Table 6, 
column 1, and 5.9, Table 7, column 1 respectively) and in the bootstrapped procedure 
(column 2).  Similarly, the t-statistic becomes 9.5 and 8.9 when a panel specification is 
used (the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly higher).  The economic magnitude is 




4.3. Further analysis   
  We perform two additional tests.  First, we include analyst coverage as an additional 
variable to reinforce our interpretation of the results based on information asymmetry and 
to control for the effect of other informational intermediaries.  Financial analysts also 
have the property of reducing information asymmetry but they typically cover larger 
companies (Table 1). As a further robustness check, we also control for the effect of bond 
rating agencies.  Results are reported in Table 8 for the capital structure and Table 9 for 
the market timing regressions.  Our main results are qualitatively similar to the ones 
obtained without the control for the two informational intermediaries.  In other words, the 
higher quality of auditing has an effect incremental to that of the other informational 
intermediaries. The effect of an improvement in analyst coverage has a pattern similar to 
the effect of an improvement in auditing.  Unsurprisingly, the debt rating helps with debt 
issuance.  This last result is consistent with Faulkender and Petersen [2005].  All these 
findings continue to hold when we use an untabulated boot-strapped procedure similar to 
the one in section 4.1 and 4.2. 
                                                 
22 The ratios of coefficients are 0.006/0.014 and 0.009/0.017 respectively.     25
Finally, the theoretical literature (e.g., Dye [1993]) usually suggests that “Big Six” 
provide better auditing services because they have both greater ability to monitor their 
clients and have “deeper pockets” in case of litigation, and thus offer a more valuable 
“insurance”.  If this “insurance effect” is the primary driver for our results, we expect that 
the effect of the Big Six should be stronger when their expected liability is greater. To 
test this hypothesis, we interact a dummy for industries with high litigation risk (Hogan 
[1999]) with BigSix in our capital structure regression (see equation (3)).
23  T h e  
interaction is not significant.  We replicate this test with the z-score as “auditors’ greatest 
liability derives from auditing clients that subsequently experience financial distress” 
(Dye [1993]).  The interaction is also insignificant.  In other words, we do not find 
evidence suggesting that the “insurance effect” is driving our results.  Instead, results 
suggest that Big Six auditors appear to be better at monitoring their clients either before 
accepting them or subsequently during the actual engagements. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We provide evidence that the difference in information asymmetry associated with 
higher quality auditors affects companies’ financing choices. Following previous 
literature that suggests auditing quality is greater for companies audited by Big Six 
auditing firms, we argue that the presence of a Big Six auditor reduces the extent of 
information asymmetry faced by outsiders.  We consider several implications.  First, we 
show that companies with Big Six auditors have less debt in their capital structure, are 
less likely to issue debt (when they issue security) and are financing a smaller portion of 
                                                 
23 We do not run the test on our timing regressions because we would have to use a three way interaction.  
This would lead to a high degree of multi-collinearity between the different variables.   26
their deficit with debt.  When we partition our sample into three sub-groups based on 
size, the above results are generally more significant for the smaller size groups, where 
sources of information other than audited financial statements are more limited. 
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, we find that companies with better auditors 
depend less on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions.   
Specifically, we find that the debt ratios of companies audited by a Big Six firm are less 
affected by past stock returns and by the BW [2002] measure of market timing.  These 
results hold in different specifications that are designed to minimize the risk that the 
endogeneity between auditor choice and financing decisions biases our results.  The also 
hold both cross-sectionally and in panel settings.  In addition, we obtain comparable 
results when we use an alternative proxy (analyst coverage) for differences in information 
asymmetry but this proxy does not subsume the effect of being audited by a Big Six 
auditor.    27
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Overall Small Medium Large
 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974 – 2003.  The overall sample is evenly partitioned 
into three size groups based on the book value of assets.  The figure reports the time trend of percentage of firms audited by Big Six. 
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Figure 2: Auditor Choice and Equity Issuance 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 
1974 – 2003.  Panel A compares the fraction of firms issuing equity from two years before to two years 
after a positive equity shock for firms audited by Big Six versus non Big Six auditors.  Firms are defined as 
issuing equity when the net equity issued divided by the book value of assets exceeds 5%.  A positive 
equity shock corresponds to an annual stock return at least one standard deviation above the firm-specific 
mean. Panel B compares the fraction of firms issuing equity from two years before to two years after a high 
market-to-book year for firms audited by Big Six versus non Big Six auditors.  A firm’s market-to-book 
ratio is high if it is above the 75
th percentile of the distribution.  Market-to-book ratio is defined as (market 






Panel A: Fraction of Firms Issuing Equity Around Positive Equity Shocks 
























Table 1: Summary Statistics (Size Grouping) 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974 – 
2003.  The overall sample is evenly partitioned into three size groups based on the book value of assets.  Age is 
the number of years since the firm entered the database. Book Value of Assets is Compustat item number 6.  
Market Capitalization is defined as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by closing stock price at the end 
of the fiscal year.  Book Debt Ratio is the ratio of total debt (debt in current liabilities + long-term debt) to book 
value of assets.  Market Debt Ratio is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity.  
Market-to-book Asset Ratio is defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of assets.  
Return on Asset is the income before depreciation and amortization divided by book value of assets.  A firm 
has debt rated if either senior or subordinated debt is rated by Standard & Poor’s.  A firm is covered by analysts 
if the number of analyst is greater than zero. The number of analysts is the maximum number of analysts 
making annual earnings forecasts any month over a twelve-month period.  Dollar figures are in millions. 
 








Age  Mean  17.6 12.3  15.9  24.5 
  Median  14 10  14  25 
Book Value of Assets  Mean  1,788.2 24.36  176.7  5163.4 
 Median  52.94 21.02  152.9  1,500.0 
 Standard  Deviation  7,828.6 16.6  93.1  12,913.4 
Market Capitalization  Mean  1,795.9 34.2  203.0  5,150.5 
 Median  114.3 17.14  111.3  1,199.2 
 Standard  Deviation  10,250.0 57.5  309.6  17,268.4 
Book Debt Ratio  Mean  0.243 0.214  0.239  0.277 
 Median  0.214 0.151  0.206  0.257 
 Standard  Deviation  0.234 0.278  0.222  0.187 
Market Debt Ratio  Mean  0.194 0.158  0.203  0.220 
 Median  0.154 0.095  0.160  0.191 
 Standard  Deviation  0.178 0.174  0.190  0.165 
Return on Asset  Mean  7.8% -3.2%  11.9%  14.6% 
 Median  12.1% 6.5%  12.8%  14.4% 
 Standard  Deviation 44.2% 73.9%  12.6%  8.0% 
Market-to-book Asset Ratio  Mean  1.84 2.22  1.65  1.64 
 Median  1.30 1.37  1.24  1.31 
Standard Deviation  1.92 2.74  1.35  1.24 
          
Percentage of firms having debt rated  16.9% 1.4%  6.5%  44.1% 
        
Percentage of firms being covered by 
analysts  49.7% 24.9%  58.5%  65.6% 
        
Percentage of firms being audited by Big Six  85.9% 71.4%  90.5%  95.8% 
        
Number of Firm-years  79,844 26,615  26,614  26,615 
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients among key variables  
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974 – 2003.  Book Value of Assets is Compustat item number 
6.  Big Six Dummy equals one if a firm chose a Big Six Auditor, and zero otherwise.  Book Debt Ratio is the ratio of total debt (debt in current liabilities + long-term debt) 
to book value of assets.  Market Debt Ratio is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity.  Market-to-book Asset Ratio is defined as (market 
value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of assets.  Return on Asset is the income before depreciation and amortization divided by book value of assets.  
Tangibility is net PPE-to-asset ratio.  Altman’s Un-leveraged Z-score equals (3.3 × pretax income + sales + 1.4 × retained earnings + 1.2 × (current assets - current 
liabilities) / book value of assets).  Pair-wise correlation coefficients among variables are reported.  Correlation coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5% and 
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Ratio  -0.001  1.00         
Market Debt 
Ratio  -0.005 0.778
*** 1.00           
Log (Assets)  0.309
*** 0.100
*** 0.144
*** 1.00         
Market-to-
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Table 3: Determinants of Auditor Choice (estimated with a Probit regression) 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974 – 2003. The overall sample is evenly partitioned into three size 
groups based on total assets.  The dependent variable is the Big Six Dummy which equals one if a firm chose a Big Six Auditor, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years 
since a firm entered the dataset.  Industry Median Market Debt Ratios are computed by 3-digit SIC code and by year. Asset Growth is the change in log of total assets. Litigation 
Risk Dummy equals one if the firm is in a high litigation-risk industry and 0 otherwise. Herfindahl Index is computed by summing squared market shares within each 3-digit SIC 
industry. Market-to-book Asset Ratio is (market value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of assets.  Stock Price is the median monthly closing prices over a 12-month 
period. R&D Dummy equals one if R&D expense is missing.   Return on Assets is income before depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Loss Making Dummy equals 
one if the firm incurred a loss in the previous year, zero otherwise. Tangibility is net PPE-to-asset ratio.   Asset turnover is sales divided by total assets. Current Ratio equals 
current assets divided by total assets.  Stock Return Volatility is standard deviation of daily stock returns calculated for each firm each year. Earning Volatility is standard deviation 
of EBIT-to-asset ratios over a firm’s entire life in Compustat. All explanatory variables are measured one year before a firm’s auditor choice is observed. Coefficients significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked with *, ** and *** in superscripts.  Constant terms and year dummies are included in regressions but not reported. z-statistics in 
parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given firm. 
 
Overall Sample  Group 1 (Small)  Group 2 (Medium)  Group 3 (Large)  Auditor Choice (BigSix) 
Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef.  z-stat. 
Log (Assets)  0.298
*** (16.2) 0.442
*** (15.2) 0.277
*** (6.4)  0.016  (0.4) 




Log (Stock Price)  0.110*** (5.1)  0.041*  (1.7) 0.152
*** (3.4) 0.213
*** (2.7) 




Return on Assets  0.042 (-0.3) 0.016 (0.8) 0.575
* (1.6) 1.188
** (2.0) 
Return on Asset × Loss Making Dummy  0.278 (1.5) 0.115 (0.5) 0.817 (1.6) -0.322  (-0.2) 
Industry Median Market Debt Ratio  -0.864*** (-5.4) -1.079
*** (-4.9) -0.768
*** (-2.9)  -0.448  (-1.3) 





Stock Return Volatility  -1.24
*** (-2.7)  -2.044
*** (-4.0)  -1.566  (-1.2)  2.473  (0.8) 
Earning Volatility  -0.001
***  (-5.8) 0.003 (1.0) 0.000 (0.7) -0.000  (-1.5) 
Litigation Risk Dummy  -0.209***  (-2.4) -0.104 (-1.0) -0.161 (-1.3)  -0.360
*** (-2.4) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.176* (-1.7)  -0.371
***  (-3.0) -0.053 (-0.3) 0.530
* (1.8) 
Market-to-Book Asset Ratio  0.005 (0.8) 0.009 (1.3) 0.018 (0.9) 0.016  (0.5) 
Asset Growth  -0.108*** (-4.8) -0.143*** (-5.4) -0.182***  (-4.06)  -0.085  (-1.1) 
Number of Industrial Segments  -0.006* (-1.8)  -0.017
***  (-3.2) -0.002 (-0.4) -0.002  (0.4) 
R&D to Sales Ratio  0.201*** (6.7) 0.169
*** (5.7)  0.407*  (1.7) 3.819
*** (3.1) 
R&D Dummy  -0.069* (-1.9) -0.105
**  (-2.2) -0.068 (-1.1) -0.015  (-0.2) 
Tangibility  0.210* (1.8)  0.496
***  (3.7) 0.204 (1.0) -0.306  (-1.0) 
Current Ratio  0.223** (2.0) 0.618
*** (5.0) 0.465
** (2.0)  -0.881
*** (-2.4) 
Firm-years  79,844 26,615 26,614  26,615   36
Table 4: Target Adjustment Model and Auditor Choice (estimated with an OLS regression) 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974-2003.  The overall sample is evenly partitioned into three 
size groups based on book value of assets.  The dependent variable is Market Debt Ratio that equals the ratio of total debt to market value of assets.    Explanatory 
variables include the lagged Market Debt Ratio, Big Six Dummy as well as a set of control variables.  Big Six Dummy equals one if a firm chose a Big Six Auditor, and 
zero otherwise. Share Turnover is the median value of shares traded (volume) in a month divided by shares outstanding over a twelve-month period.  Annual Stock Return 
is the compounded monthly stock return in the past fiscal year. Other control variables are defined in Table 2.  All explanatory variables are measured one year before a 
firm’s debt ratio is observed.  Coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked with *, ** and *** in superscripts.  Constant terms and year 
dummies are included in regressions but not reported. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, which 
are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given firm.  
 
Overall Sample  Group 1(Small)  Group 2 (Medium)  Group 3 (Large)  Market Debt Ratio (TDM) 
Coef.  t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Lagged Debt Ratio  0.848
*** (265.7)  0.814
*** (137.7) 0.863
*** (163.5)  0.860
*** (140.3) 
Big Six Dummy  -0.005
*** (-4.4)  -0.007
*** (-4.9) -0.004
** (-2.1) -0.001  (-0.3) 
Log (Assets)  0.002
*** (5.7)  0.003
*** (3.3) -0.011
*** (-8.7)  -0.002
*** (-3.6) 
Log (Age)  -0.006
*** (-11.6)  -0.004
** (-3.7) -0.008
*** (-7.7)  -0.006
*** (-7.0) 
Tangibility  0.020
*** (9.4)  0.022
*** (5.8) 0.023
*** (5.8)  0.012
*** (3.6) 
Industry Median Debt Ratio  0.027
*** (6.5)  0.032
*** (3.9) 0.029
*** (3.8)  0.018
*** (2.9) 
Return On Assets  -0.007 (-1.4)  -0.006 (-1.0)  -0.024
** (-3.0) -0.009  (-0.8) 
Share Turnover   2.103
*** (4.7) 1.825 (1.8)  2.022
*** (2.6) 2.007
** (2.8) 
Annual Stock Return  -0.001
** (-2.3)  -0.002
* (-2.5)  -0.003
*** (-2.5)  0.000  (0.1) 
Market-to-Book Asset Ratio   -0.000 (-2.5)  0.000 (0.0) -0.001  (-2.9)  -0.001
** (-2.0) 
R&D to Sales Ratio  -0.005
*** (-8.2)  -0.005
*** (-6.5) -0.008
*** (-5.7)  -0.010  (-2.0) 
R&D Dummy  0.007
*** (9.5)  0.006
*** (4.3) 0.008
*** (5.7)  0.006
*** (5.1) 
Un-leveraged Z Score  -0.000 (-0.9)  0.000 (0.5)  -0.001
* (-1.7)  -0.002
*** (-3.7) 
Dividend to Asset Ratio  -0.149
*** (-8.0)  -0.169
*** (-5.0)  -0.130
* (-4.3) -0.067 (-2.1) 
Stock Return Volatility  -0.170




Earning Volatility  -0.000
*** (-11.3) -0.000  (-0.7) -0.000
*** (-5.0)  -0.000
*** (-5.0) 
              
R
2/ Firm-years  0.74/78,731 0.69/26,471 0.76/26,182  0.77/26,078 
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Table 5: Target Adjustment Model and Auditor Choice (Robustness Checks) 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974-
2003. The dependent variable is Market Debt Ratio that equals the ratio of total debt to market value of assets.  
Column (1) reports leverage regression in Table 4 using a two-stage procedure.  In the first stage, the likelihood 
of the firm to select a Big Six auditor is predicted based on firm-specific variables in Table 2 using a Probit 
model.  In the second stage, Market Debt Ratio is regressed on predicted auditor choice and other control 
variables in Table 4.  We bootstrap the system 500 times to obtain consistent standard errors.  Confidence 
intervals in square brackets are calculated from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the dataset with 
replacement of clusters.  Coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked with *, ** 
and *** in superscripts.  Column (2) fits the treatment effects model using Heckman's two-step consistent 
estimator. Only second-step regression is reported.  T-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the 
Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across 




Treatment Effects Model 
(2)  Market Debt Ratio (TDM) 
Coef. 95%  interval  Coef. t-stat. 
Lagged Debt Ratio  0.846 [0.839,  0.853]  0.849
*** (359.5) 
Predicted Auditor Choice  -0.026 [-0.042,  -0.012]  -0.044
*** (-9.2) 
Log (Assets)  0.009 [0.005,  0.015]  0.004
*** (10.4) 
Log (Age)  -0.009 [-0.011,  -0.007]  -0.006
*** (-10.4) 
Tangibility  0.019 [0.014,  0.025]  0.019
*** (10.5) 
Industry Median Debt Ratio  0.017 [-0.002,  0.034]  0.020
*** (5.0) 
Return On Asset  -0.005 [-0.017,  0.005]  -0.007
*** (-3.0) 
Share Turnover  2.137 [1.251,  3.056]  1.915
*** (4.3) 
Annual Stock Return  -0.002 [-0.003,  -0.001]  -0.002
*** (-2.9) 
Market-to-Book Asset Ratio  -0.000  [-0.0005,  0.0005] -0.000 (-0.5) 
R&D to Sales Ratio  -0.000 [-0.004,  0.004]  -0.004
*** (-5.7) 
R&D Dummy  0.004 [0.002,  0.006]  0.006
*** (8.0) 
Un-leveraged Z Score  -0.0003  [-0.0009,  0.0005] -0.000 (-1.1) 
Dividend to Asset Ratio  -0.139 [-0.179,  -0.098]  -0.165
*** (-7.8) 
Stock Return Volatility  -0.231 [-0.297,  -0.169]  -0.191
*** (-11.3) 
Earning Volatility  -0.003 [-0.004,  -0.002]  -0.002
*** (-11.5) 
        
Replications / Firm-years  500 74,155 
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Table 6: Market Timing and Auditor Choice - Past Stock Return 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for five or more adjacent years during 1976-
2003.  The dependent variable is Change in Market Debt Ratio from t-5 to t.    Accumulated Stock Return is 
obtained by compounding monthly stock returns from t-5 to t.  Big Six Dummy equals one if a firm chose a 
Big Six auditor at t-5, and zero otherwise.  Deviation from Target Debt Ratio is measured as the difference 
between a firm’s debt to asset ratio and target debt ratio estimated in Table 3a.  Column (1) presents OLS 
specification.  Column (2) reports regression using a two-stage procedure.  In the first stage, the likelihood of the 
firm to select a Big Six auditor is predicted based on firm-specific variables in Table 2 using Probit model.  In the 
second stage, Change in Market Debt Ratio is regressed on predicted auditor choice, interaction term between 
predicted auditor choice and accumulated past stock return from t-5 to t, and other control variables.  We 
bootstrap the system 500 times to obtain consistent standard errors.  Confidence intervals in square brackets 
are calculated from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the dataset with replacement of clusters.  
Constant terms and year dummies are included in the regressions, but not reported.   Coefficients 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked with *, ** and *** in superscripts.  T-
statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, 
which are also corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm. The 95% confidence intervals 
in brackets are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset with replacement 






Two-Stage Bootstrap  Change in Market Debt Ratio from t-5 to t 
(TDMt - TDMt-5)  Coef. t-stat. Coef. 95%  interval 
Accumulated Stock Return (ACR)  -0.014
*** (-13.9)  -0.012 [-0.015,  -0.010] 
Big Six Dummy  -0.014
*** (-5.6)  -0.011 [-0.015,  -0.006] 
ACR × Big Six Dummy  0.006
*** (5.3)  0.003 [0.001,  0.005] 
∆ Total Assets  0.001
*** (4.6)  0.001 [0,  0.002] 
∆ Market-to-book Asset Ratio  -0.011
*** (-17.6)  -0.011 [-0.012,  -0.009] 
∆ Return on Assets  -0.069
*** (-10.7)  -0.068 [-0.082,  -0.056] 
∆ Tangibility  0.166
*** (17.4)  0.166 [0.148,  0.184] 
∆ Unleveraged Z Score  -0.002
*** (-4.4)  -0.002 [-0.003,  -0.001] 
∆ Dividend to Asset Ratio  -0.728
*** (-11.8)  -0.723 [-0.848,  -0.601] 
∆ Stock Return Volatility  0.929
*** (14.10)  0.922 [0.796,  1.045] 
∆ Share Turnover  -8.739
*** (-8.3)  -8.630 [-10.73,  -6.57] 
Deviation from Target Debt Ratio  -0.360
*** (-45.7)  -0.360 [-0.375,  -0.345] 
       
R-Square  0.27  
Firm-years/Replications  58,287 500 
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Table 7: Market Timing and Auditor Choice - Baker and Wurgler’s Timing Measure 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for five or more adjacent years during 1976-
2003.  The dependent variable is Change in Market Debt Ratio from t-5 to t.  Baker and Wurgler’s “external 
finance weighted-average” market-to-book ratio (BW5MBA) is calculated from t-5 to t.  Big Six Dummy 
equals one if a firm chose a Big Six auditor at t-5, and zero otherwise. Deviation from Target Debt Ratio is 
measured as the difference between a firm’s debt to asset ratio and target debt ratio estimated in Table 3a.  
Column (1) presents OLS specification.  Column (2) reports regression using a two-stage procedure.  In the 
first stage, the likelihood of the firm to select a Big Six auditor is predicted based on firm-specific variables in 
Table 2 using Probit model.  In the second stage, Change in Market Debt Ratio is regressed on predicted 
auditor choice, interaction term between predicted auditor choice and BW5MBA, and other control variables.  We 
bootstrap the system 500 times to obtain consistent standard errors.  Confidence intervals in square brackets 
are calculated from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the dataset with replacement of clusters.  
Constant terms and year dummies are included in the regressions, but not reported.   Coefficients 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked with *, ** and *** in superscripts.  T-
statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, 
which are also corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm. The 95% confidence intervals 
in brackets are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset with replacement 





Two-Stage Bootstrap  Change in Market Debt Ratio from t-5 to t 
(TDMt - TDMt-5)  Coef. t-stat. Coef. 95%  interval 
BW5MBA  -0.017
*** (-11.6)  -0.013 [-0.015,  -0.010] 
Big Six Dummy  -0.030
*** (-8.0)  -0.016  [-0.022,  -0.011] 
BW5MBA × Big Six Dummy  0.009
*** (5.9)  0.0024  [0.001,  0.004] 
∆ Total Asset  0.001
*** (3.5)  0.001  [0,  0.002] 
∆ Market-to-book Asset Ratio  -0.014
*** (-19.13)  -0.014 [-0.016,  -0.013] 
∆ Return on Asset  -0.060
*** (-8.9)  -0.058  [-0.071,  -0.044] 
∆ Tangibility  0.158
*** (16.3)  0.157 [0.140,  0.175] 
∆ Unleveraged Z Score  -0.003
*** (-6.9)  -0.003  [-0.004,  -0.002] 
∆ Dividend to Asset Ratio  -0.851
*** (-13.1)  -0.842 [-0.972,  0.715] 
∆ Stock Return Volatility  1.084
*** (18.6)  1.099 [0.979,  1.216] 
∆ Share Turnover  -12.208
*** (-11.6)  -12.49 [-14.47,  -10.51] 
Deviation from Target Debt Ratio  -0.386
*** (-46.6)  -0.385 [-0.401,  -0.369] 
       
R-Square  0.27  
Firm-years/Replications  55,816 500 
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Table 8: Target Adjustment Model and Auditor Choice  - Additional controls for 
alternative informational intermediaries 
 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for two or more adjacent years during 1974-
2003. The dependent variable is Market Debt Ratio that equals the ratio of total debt to market value of assets.   
Explanatory variables include the lagged Market Debt Ratio, Big Six dummy as well as a set of control variables.  
Big Six Dummy equals one if a firm chose a Big Six Auditor, and zero otherwise. Share Turnover is the median 
value of shares traded (volume) in a month divided by shares outstanding over a twelve-month period.  Annual 
Stock Return is the compounded monthly stock return in the past fiscal year.  The number of analysts is the 
maximum number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts any month over a twelve-month period.  
Other control variables are defined in Table 2.  Debt Rating dummy equals one if either senior or subordinated 
debt is rated by Standard & Poor’s, and zero otherwise.  All explanatory variables are measured one year before a 
firm’s debt ratio is observed.  Coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked with *, 
** and *** in superscripts.  Constant terms and year dummies are included in regressions but not reported. T-
statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, which 




Market Debt Ratio (TDM) 
Coef. t-statistics 
Big Six  -0.005
***  (-4.3) 
Number of Analysts  -0.000
***  (-12.2) 
Debt Rating  0.010
***  (9.5) 
Lagged Debt Ratio  0.842
***  (259.1) 
Log (Assets)  0.002
***  (5.2) 
Log (Age)  -0.006
***  (-11.29) 
Tangibility  0.021
***  (10.0) 
Industry Median Debt Ratio  0.026
***  (6.1) 
Return On Asset  -0.006 (-1.3) 
Share Turnover   2.609
***  (5.9) 
Annual Stock Return  -0.002
***  (-2.9) 
Market-to-Book Asset Ratio   0.000 (-1.6) 
R&D to Sales Ratio  0.005
***  (-7.8) 
R&D Dummy  0.007
***  (8.9) 
Un-leveraged Z Score  -0.000 (-0.4) 
Dividend to Asset Ratio  -0.140
***  (-7.5) 
Stock Return Volatility  -0.171
***  (-6.8) 
Earning Volatility  -0.001
***  (-9.7) 
R-Square  0.74 
Firm-years  78,731 
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 Table 9: Market Timing and Auditor Choice - Additional controls for alternative 
informational intermediaries 
 
Sample includes all Industrial Compustat firms with complete data for five or more adjacent years during 1976-
2003.   The dependent variable is Change in Market Debt Ratio from t-5 to t.  Baker and Wurgler’s 
“external finance weighted-average” market-to-book ratio (BW5MBA) is calculated from t-5 to t. 
Accumulated Stock Return (ASR) is obtained by compounding monthly stock returns from t-5 to t.   Big Six 
Dummy equals one if a firm chose a Big Six auditor at t-5, and zero otherwise.  The number of analysts is the 
maximum number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts any month between t-6 and t-5.   Debt 
Rating dummy equals one if either senior or subordinated debt is rated by Standard & Poor’s at t-5, and zero 
otherwise.   Deviation from Target Debt Ratio is measured as the difference between a firm’s debt to asset 
ratio and target debt ratio estimated in Table 3a.  Constant terms and year dummies are included in the 
regressions, but not reported.   Coefficients significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels are respectively marked 
with *, ** and *** in superscripts.  T-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the 
Huber/White/sandwich heteroscedastic consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across 
observations of a given firm.   
 
  
Past Stock Return (ASR)  Baker and Wurgler’s Timing 
Measure (BW5MBA)  Change in Market Debt Ratio 
from t-5 to t 
Coef. t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat. 
BW5MBA / ASR  -0.014
*** (-14.2)  -0.017
*** (-11.7) 
Big Six  × BW5MBA / ASR  0.006
*** (5.6)  0.009
*** (5.9) 
 Nbr Analysts × BW5MBA/ASR  0.000
** (2.3)  0.000
*** (2.3) 
Debt Rating × BW5MBA / ASR  -0.008
*** (-5.1) -0.007 (-2.5) 
Big Six Dummy  -0.014
*** (-5.4)  -0.030
*** (-7.9) 
Number of Analysts  -0.000
*** (-3.9)  -0.001
*** (-3.9) 
Debt Rating  0.014
*** (4.3)  0.022
*** (3.8) 
∆ Total Asset  0.000
*** (4.3)  0.001
*** (4.9) 
∆ Market-to-book Asset Ratio  -0.011
*** (-17.6)  -0.014
*** (-19.1) 
∆ Return on Asset  -0.070
*** (-10.8)  -0.060
*** (-8.9) 
∆ Tangibility  0.165
*** (17.3)  0.157
*** (16.2) 
∆ Unleveraged Z Score  -0.002
*** (-4.3)  -0.003
*** (-6.8) 
∆ Dividend to Asset Ratio  -0.728
*** (-11.9)  -0.848
*** (-13.1) 
∆ Stock Return Volatility  0.925
*** (14.0)  1.080
*** (18.6) 
∆ Share Turnover  -8.886
*** (-8.5)  -12.164
*** (-11.5) 
Deviation from Target Debt Ratio  -0.364
*** (-45.6)  -0.392
*** (-46.7) 
    
R-Square  0.27 0.27 
Firm-years  58,287 55,816 
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Appendix: Control Variables in Leverage Regressions. 
 
As mentioned in section 3, in our regressions, we control for a set of variables that have been shown by 
prior literature to influence capital structure (e.g. Frank and Goyal [2003,a]).  Note that we propose 
reasonably well-accepted interpretations of the different control variables but that alternative interpretations 
may be possible.  This, however, does not affect our main conclusions.  As a robustness check, we also 
include, capital expenditure over assets, NBER recession dummies, corporate tax rate, whether the firm is 
in a regulated industry or in a “unique” industry (in the sense of Titman [1984]) as additional control 
variables in the leverage regressions.  However, their effect is not robust across specifications and their 
presence does not affect our main results. Specifically, we consider the following control variables: 
 
• Firm general characteristics: It is well documented (e.g., Harris and Raviv [1991]) that larger firms have 
higher leverage.  Hence, we include the log of the book value of assets as a proxy for firm size.  Firms 
having more tangible assets are expected to support more debt since these assets can be pledged as 
collateral.  The net PPE-to-asset ratio measures the tangibility of the firm’s assets. Research and 
development expense scaled by sales can proxy for a variety of firm characteristics, such as uniqueness 
of the product (Titman [1984]), information asymmetry or growth potential. We also introduce an R&D 
dummy which equals one if R&D expense is missing.  In addition, Frank and Goyal [2003,a] show that 
industry leverage is one of the strongest determinants of corporate leverage; we therefore include the 
median industry leverage ratio, defined as the median of the ratio of total debt to the market value of 
assets - by three-digit SIC code and by year.  We also control for the maturity of the firm by including the 
log of the age plus one, where age is measured as the number of years since the IPO year. 
 
•  Analyst coverage: Chang et al.[2004] stress the relevance of this variable. The data on analyst coverage 
are obtained from the I/B/E/S Historical Summary File.  For each year, we set the number of analysts 
following a firm as the maximum number of analysts who make annual earning forecasts any month over 
a twelve-month period.  We assume that firms not covered by I/B/E/S have no analyst coverage.  
  
• Profitability: Various theories of capital structure suggest that leverage should be related to profitability.  
For example, it could be argued that profitability is a proxy for debt capacity, and there should therefore 
be a positive association between profitability and leverage according. We use the return on asset (the 
ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization to assets) as the proxy for profitability. 
 
• Liquidity: Share turnover is the median value of monthly shares traded (volume) divided by shares 
outstanding over a twelve-month period. 
 
• Past Stock Performance and Growth Opportunities: Firms are more likely to issue equity when their 
stock price performance has been good.  To control for the past stock performance, we use, in alternative   43
specifications, two cumulative stock returns, which are obtained by compounding monthly returns from 
t-2 to t-1 and from t-6 to t-1, respectively.  We also use the market-to-book ratio as a control for growth 
opportunities. Most studies document a negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage, 
possibly because growth firms have greater incentives to avoid debt overhang problems.  Since the POH 
maintains that firms finance their asset growth mainly with debt, we include asset growth as another 
control for growth opportunity.  
 
• Payout Policy:  Capital structure may be related to a firm’s payout policy.  If current profits are positively 
correlated with future profits, firms expecting higher future profits may payout more dividends as well as 
lower debt ratios by retiring debt.  On the other hand, to the extent that higher future profits reflect higher 
debt capacity, firms that pay more dividends may choose higher debt ratios.  We use the ratio of 
dividends to assets as our payout variable.  
 
• Risk and Financial Constraints: We control for risk and financial constraints faced by the firm.  In the 
Tradeoff theory, firms react to risk by reducing leverage.  Hence, we include Altman’s unleveraged Z-
score, stock return volatility and earning volatility as controls for risk.  Stock Return volatility is 
measured as the standard deviation of the daily stock return calculated for each firm for each year.  
Earning volatility is defined as the standard deviation of EBIT to total asset ratio over a firm’s entire life 
in Compustat.  We also include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a debt rating 
assigned by Standard & Poor’s.  Rated firms are more credit worthy and have better access to corporate 
debt markets (Faulkender and Petersen [2003]). 
 